Real-world cloud security. Explained and applied.
csip_admin What changes when an LLM operates a computer as an “agent” and how that fits into a Command & Control (C2) model. An operational walkthrough of the architecture, realistic abuse, detection signals, and controls that actually work in corporate environments.
Attackers are using “normal” cloud APIs and services (storage, messaging, repos, CDN, functions) as a Command & Control channel. This operations guide explains why it works in enterprises, what signals to look for, how to contain it without breaking the business, and how to set up verifiable guardrails in AWS/Azure/GCP.
Operational guide to the OWASP Top 10 applied to corporate cloud environments: where people fail in production, early signals, real examples, and concrete actions to reduce exposure without slowing teams down.
Yes: AI can accelerate and scale attacks in Cloud, not “hack magically”. The real risk lies in automating reconnaissance, exploiting misconfigured identities, and abusing control planes, with autonomous loops that iterate until they achieve access or impact.
Cloud credential harvesting is not “just phishing”: it combines large-scale collection of credentials, tokens, and API keys with IAM abuse and automation to move fast inside cloud accounts. This article lands operational signals, frequent scenarios, and practical controls that reduce the blast radius in corporate environments.
The most repeated pattern in cloud incidents is no longer “exploiting a vulnerability”, but “using valid credentials”. The focus shifts to non-human identities (APIs, automation and SaaS integrations) and how tokens are issued, stored and reused in real operations.
Starkiller is a phishing service that acts as a proxy between the user and the real login, capturing credentials, cookies, and session tokens in the moment. This article explains how real-time interception works, what signals it leaves in a company, and how to run practical defenses without falling into cosmetic measures.
BloodHound Enterprise expands its reach beyond Microsoft to map identity attack paths that traverse Okta and GitHub. In companies where identity is the new perimeter, this expansion makes it possible to see (and prioritize) real chaining between SSO, repositories, and privileges.
Serverless removes servers to manage, it does not remove risk. We debunk common myths and get practical: excessive permissions, exposed endpoints, event injection, vulnerable dependencies, and poorly managed secrets in AWS Lambda, Azure Functions, and GCP Cloud Functions, as well as how attackers pivot from a compromised function and which quick wins to apply in production.
Identity abuse almost never starts with “root compromised”: it starts with valid credentials used out of context. This article walks through actionable signals (anomalous tokens, pattern changes, unusual API calls, unexpected geolocation) and how to instrument logs in AWS/Azure/GCP to detect it before the impact is irreversible.