Real-world cloud security. Explained and applied.
csip_admin When a provider labels a CVSS 10 as “No Action Required”, the patch is on the service side… but the risk does not disappear. In corporate cloud, shared responsibility means assuming the impact can still materialize: telemetry, exposure, credentials, configuration, and operational response are still yours.
Legacy tokens (including “actor” patterns in S2S flows) and the use of obsolete APIs such as Azure AD Graph have been a dangerous combination: they enable privileged operations without going through the same guardrails we now expect (MFA and Conditional Access). This article breaks down how Global Admin impersonation materializes in Entra ID, what signals to look for, and how to run it in practice to close the gap.
“Bucket squatting” in GCP around Vertex AI (CVE-2026-2473) showed a dangerous pattern: if a pipeline trusts predictable Cloud Storage names and does not validate bucket ownership/identity, an attacker can create that bucket first and force malicious uploads/reads, leading to remote execution and model poisoning. This article breaks down the scenario, operational signals, and mitigations applicable in enterprises.
Technical postmortem of the Storm-2949 case in Azure: how an identity-based chain and abuse of App Services enabled exfiltration of Key Vault secrets and SQL Database data without deploying malware, and which signals and controls failed in corporate environments.
Dirty Frag (CVE-2026-43284) allows, under specific conditions, escalating to root on the AWS EKS node from a compromised container. This article describes the attack surface, operational signals, and how to apply seccomp profiles and validate them in EKS to break the exploitation chain.
In 2026, most initial intrusions in AWS do not start with an exploit, but with stolen credentials and sessions. This article explains why it happens (including the 83% identity-focused figure), what operational signals reveal it in AWS, and how to harden IAM/STS without breaking corporate operations.
Exposing Ollama as an API on a public instance without authentication is a recipe for data leakage, compute abuse, and shadow AI. This article walks through a typical cloud architecture, the most common failure points, and how to implement segmentation, API Gateway, authentication, and verifiable operational controls.
Session cookie theft via Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) allows an attacker to reuse an already authenticated session in the cloud console, even when the administrator has MFA. This article breaks down operational signals, real business impact, and practical mitigations based on conditional access, network validation, and reducing session surface area.
Native Kubernetes Secrets do not “encrypt”: they encode in Base64. In corporate environments this translates into exposure via logs, overly broad RBAC, etcd without encryption, and pipelines that leak credentials. How to understand the real risk and operate External Secrets Operator with Azure Key Vault or AWS Secrets Manager without breaking deployment.
Denial of Wallet (DoW) exploits cloud elasticity to force consumption and drive up costs: cryptomining, massive scaling, artificial traffic, and abuse of managed services. This article breaks down real signals, containment, and operational guardrails (quotas, anomaly alerts, IAM) to reduce economic impact without breaking operations.