Cloud Architecture & Security

Shadow APIs appear when teams deploy endpoints in API Gateway/App Engine outside the central WAF or without inventory. This article explains signals, risk scenarios (including internal APIs exposed via SSRF), and a practical method to discover them with Cloud Asset Inventory and enumeration tools.

Disabling an identity in Microsoft Entra ID does not necessarily invalidate every session already issued in Azure, AWS, and Google Cloud. This article explains why, and how to design effective offboarding in federated environments.

How to integrate Microsoft Entra ID with Google Cloud using Cloud Identity, selective user and group provisioning, SAML, and IAM while keeping a central identity source and cloud-native authorization.

How to integrate Microsoft Entra ID with AWS IAM Identity Center using SAML and SCIM to access AWS accounts, CloudShell, and Terraform without creating IAM Users or distributing Access Keys.

How to centralize identity for Azure, AWS, and Google Cloud training labs with Microsoft Entra ID while keeping authorization native to each cloud and avoiding long-lived credentials.

A practical, operations-oriented explanation of vulnerability CVE-2026-40379 in Azure’s Enterprise Security Token Service (ESTS): how identity spoofing can be attempted at the token provider level, what signals appear in corporate environments, and what controls help reduce the impact.

When a provider labels a CVSS 10 as “No Action Required”, the patch is on the service side… but the risk does not disappear. In corporate cloud, shared responsibility means assuming the impact can still materialize: telemetry, exposure, credentials, configuration, and operational response are still yours.

“Bucket squatting” in GCP around Vertex AI (CVE-2026-2473) showed a dangerous pattern: if a pipeline trusts predictable Cloud Storage names and does not validate bucket ownership/identity, an attacker can create that bucket first and force malicious uploads/reads, leading to remote execution and model poisoning. This article breaks down the scenario, operational signals, and mitigations applicable in enterprises.

Exposing Ollama as an API on a public instance without authentication is a recipe for data leakage, compute abuse, and shadow AI. This article walks through a typical cloud architecture, the most common failure points, and how to implement segmentation, API Gateway, authentication, and verifiable operational controls.

Denial of Wallet (DoW) exploits cloud elasticity to force consumption and drive up costs: cryptomining, massive scaling, artificial traffic, and abuse of managed services. This article breaks down real signals, containment, and operational guardrails (quotas, anomaly alerts, IAM) to reduce economic impact without breaking operations.